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NOTICE 
This report was prepared 85 an account of work sponsored by the 
United States Government. Neither the United States nor the United 
States Department of Energy, nor any of their employeas, makes eny 
warranty, express or implied, or assumes any legal liability or 
responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of any 
information. apparatus, product, or process disclored, or represents 
that i t s  use would not infrinw privately owned rights. Raference 
herein to any specific commercial product. process, or service by 
t r d e  name, mark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not necessarily 
constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by 
the United States Government or any agency thereof. The views and 
opinions of authors expressed herein do not necessarily state or 
reflect thoie of the United States Government or any agency thereof. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
In this white paper, the major factors involved in the evaluation of the 
Satellite Power System's (SPS) feasibility and in SPS financing and manage- 
ment are presented. Areas for further research are also enumerated. 
The financial attractiveness of any project depends primarily upon the 
relationship between its anticipated reward and expected risk. Cash flow 
analyses under several assumptions produced preliminary "best estimate" 
returns on investment ranging between four and fifteen percent for the SPS. 
Project downside risk at this time is considered high. Numerous factors 
including satellite malfunction and interference, and potential international 
repercussions threaten the project. Opportunity costs associated with altern- 
ative methods of power generation have not been analyzed sufficiently. 
Finally, cost overruns may be particularly large. Nevertheless, it is pre- 
mature to conclude that the SPS is not feasible. Several steps can be taken 
to materially reduce the risks, and these are reviewed in the white paper. 
Financing and management requirements for the SPS will differ markedly 
at each of its three stages of growth--research and development, start-up, 
and maturity. It is clear, however, that the U.S. government (and perhaps 
a consortium of governments) will need to finance and manage the project 
during the first two (and perhaps all three) stages. 
The private sector, nevertheless, will participate from the beginning in 
the roles of suppliers and contractors. As such, they will form an important 
part of the SPS organizational pyramid. Administering this dynamic pyramid 
and representing the SPS in its relationships with its external environment 
present a supreme challenge to the practice of management. 
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APPENDIX 
I .  INTRODUCTION 
The objective of this white paper is to assess the potential feasibility 
and advantages of alternative SPS financing and management scenerios . This 
was accomplished through (1)  a search of the relevant literature (see bibli- 
ography), (2) interviews and discussions with financial, government, and 
academic professionals , and (3) the development and implementation of orig- 
inal cash flow and return on investment models based upon the current NASA 
preliminary costing estimates. 
1 
The paper is divided into three major sections dealing with financial 
analysis, finance and management, and areas for  further research. The 
separation of finance and management was done to facilitate exposition of the 
subject matter. 
The author is indebted to a large number of people who gave willingly of 
their time and ideas to this study. Most of them are acknowledged as sources 
in the bibliography. Planning Research Corporation personnel encouraged 
and assisted the author in many ways, and gratitude for this help is hereby 
acknowledged. Mr. Lawrence S .  Campbell, Dr. T.  Stephen Cheston, and Mr. 
Michael A .  G .  Michaud reviewed the first draft and their comments were most 
helpful. 
In practice, the two are closely interrelated. 
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11. FINANCING : THE RISK/REWARD TRADEOFF 
The financial attractiveness of the SPS concept wiU depend primarily on 
the relationship between its anticipated rewards and expected risk as com- 
pared with other power generation alternatives. Reward o r  benefit can be 
expressed as a percentage return on investment (internal rate of return). 
Risk can be expressed qualitatively in words o r  quantitatively by a number of 
methods. In this section both returns and risks are discussed under a 
variety of scenerios . 
RETURNS 
A number of estimates of SPS project returns have been made over the 
2 past few years using a variety of revenue and cost data and assumptions. 
The data used in this white paper were developed in consultation with NASA, 
using the Planning Research Corporation's computer model. .All statistics are 
expressed in constant dollars of 1977. 
Exhibit 11- 1 shows preliminary estimates of research and development 
costs spread over the years 1981 to 1999. The total cost of $76 billion will be 
allocated among three phases : technology development and verification ; 
design, development, test and evaluation; and the construction of a working 
prototype. Exhibit 11-2 displays a breakdown of the capital preliminary 
estimate for investment expenditures required to build one complete five 
gigawatt SPS. Nearly half the estimated $12 billion capital requirement is 
expended on the satellite portion of the system. Capital replacement expendi- 
tures currently are expected to be $138 million per year for each SPS. 
Annual operations and maintenance costs could amount to approximately $17 
million per, system. Property taxes and insurance on the rectenna are esti- 
mated at  $82 million annually per system. 
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Exhibit 11- 2 
SATELLITE POWER SYSTEM 
PRELIMINARY ESTIMATE 
CAPITAL INVESTMENT REQUIRED 
PER SYSTEM 
($ Billions, 1977) 
Component 
Satellite 
Solar Cell Blankets 
Antenna System 
Other 
Total Satellite 
Ground Station 
Assembly & Support 
Transportation 
Management & Systems 
Contingency 
TOTAL 
Engineering & Integration 
Investment 
Required 
$ 2.086 
2.174 
a989 
5.249 
3.319 
.382 
1.386 
.517 
1.105 
11.958 
Percent of Total 
1% 
18 
8 
43 
29 
3 
12 
4 
9 
100 
- 
Source: NASA 
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The Assumptions and the Returns 
In developing cash flow estimates based on these figures, some rather 
conservative assumptions were made. I t  was assumed that the SPS would 
shoulder a state and federal income tax burden of 50 percent of profits. 
Currently, this tax can be partially avoided by the ten percent investment 
tax credit; and payment can be partially delayed by accelerated depreciation 
methods. However, it was assumed that by the year 2000, a less liberal tax 
climate would prevail. Thus, the investment tax credit used here is only five 
percent and straight line depreciation is assumed. 
Revenues based upon a charge of $.04 per kilowatt hour were assumed 
since $.04 was the average U.S. price in 1977. At that price, each five 
gigawatt system would produce $1.6 billion in revenues annually. Two 
systems per year will be placed in operation between the years 2000 and 2029. 
According to some engi- 
neers, it would be as reasonable to select a 40 year life. Finally, it was 
assumed that the five gigawatt satellite to be placed in orbit during the 
research and development phase will not produce revenues. 
Also, a system life of 30 years was assumed. 
Two net cash flows were developed. The first included the research and 
development costs shown in Exhibit 11-1, while the second did not. Net cash 
flow is the difference between cash inflow from revenues and cash outflow 
occasioned by operating costs, the purchase of plant and equipment, and so 
on. In some years (particularly at the begining), net cash flow will be 
negative; while in others, it will be positive. 
The rationale for including research and development is obvious. The 
rationale for excluding it is perhaps less so. However, it can be argued that 
at least some, and perhaps all, of the $76 billion spent to develop the first 
SPS will result in many applications above and beyond the immediate one of 
providing power. To burden the Sps project with the total research and 
6 
development costs would be to understate the benefits derived from its imple- 
mentation. 
An internal rate of return (IRR) was calculated for each net cash flow 
estimate. The IRR is a rate of return that equates the present value of cash 
inflows from a project to the present value of its cash outflows. Given the 
initial (conservative) assumptions, the actual IRR for the project when re- 
search and development is included is four percent. The actual IRR for the 
project when research and development is excluded is six percent. 
These IRR figures represent the actual returns that would be realized 
from the specific project given the assumptions associated with the cash 
flows. Although they are "actual" they are not strictly comparable to one 
another for two reasons. 
In the first place, the cash flow that includes research and development 
was discounted to the "present" point of 1981, since the first expenditure 
occurs then. When research and development is excluded, the "present" 
becomes 1996. Secondly, the amount and timing of investment required dif- 
fers  between the alternatives. Comparison requires either the investment 
required (cost) or the return (benefit) to be the same for all alternatives. 
To be strictly comparable, the "research and development excluded" cash 
flow alternative should have added to it the cash flows from a project expend- 
ing funds at a pace and amount equal to the SPS research and development 
expenditures. Furthermore, the new project's cash outflow should begin in 
1981. In this way, both alternatives would be compared on the basis of an 
equal cash outflow (investment required) over a similar time period. On the 
other hand, such a comparison is totally unrealistic and illogical. 
I t  should be stated again, as we l l ,  that the data used in these cash flow 
calculations (and reflected in the IRRs) are expressed in constant 1977 
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dollars. If inflation was built into the numbers, the return on investment 
would be higher than otherwise because a compound inflation rate would be 
applied to a cash flow which is negative at  first and positive later on. In 
other words, an inflated positive net cash flow later on in the project's life 
would be combined with a - less inflated negative net cash flow earlier in the 
project's life. In interpreting this discounted cash flow data, care must be 
taken to compare the IRRs with interest rates which do not contain provisions 
for inflation. And today, published interest rates are highly inflated. 
Returns Under Relaxed Assumptions 
The returns on the SPS, although low under the conservative assump- 
tions, change for the better when some of them are relaxed. Consider the 
assumption of a $.04 per kilowatt hour price. That price can be compared 
with a 1977 average price paid by residential electricity users in the U . S .  of 
$.0376, up f rom $.0321 in 1976. On a regional basis, however, residential 
prices vary dramatically. In 1976, for example, a customer in the Pacific 
Northwest paid $.015 per kilowatt hour, while a resident in the Northeast 
paid $.048. 3 
Furthermore, recent history has witnessed a dramatic increase in prices 
of electricity and raw materials used in the production of energy. Over the 
past five years, the cost of electricity has increased at an average annual 
rate of 1 1 . 2  percent. The follow- 
ing tabulation in Exhibit 11-3 shows the price changes for three raw materials 
Since 1969, prices have nearly d ~ u b l e d . ~  
over the past few years adjusted for inflation and expressed in 1975 dollars. 
Given these data, and assuming that the demand for power will continue 
to increase while its availability continues to decline, a price of $ . lo  per 
kilowatt hour in 1977 constant dollars by the year 2000 A . D .  is not unreason- 
able. A price of $ . l o  per kilowatt hour yields an actual IRR of ten percent 
8 
with research and development included. When the return was calculated 
without research and development, the actual return at the "present" date of 
1996 was 15 percent. 
Exhibit 11-3 
PRICES OF RAW MATERIALS 
(1975 $> 
Natural Gas at 
Crude Oil' Wellhead Per Coal Per 
Year Per Barrel 1000 Cu.Ft.  Ton 
1970 $ 4.39 $ .24  
1971 4.44 .24 
1972 4.26 -24 
1973 4.74 .26 
1974 9.69 .33 
1975 10.00 .45 
1976 10.03 -- 
$ 8.72 
9.37 
9.75 
10.26 
17.22 
19.24 
19.02 
1. Average of wellhead domestic crude and CIF value of imported 
crude. 
Source: Bureau of Mines, FEA "Energy in Focus: Basic Data," 
May, 1977. 
Clearly, there is significant improvement when $. 10 per kilowatt hour is 
used. Some care must be taken, however, in comparing the returns of the 
$.04 assumption with those of the $.lo assumption because, again, the invest- 
ment bases are different. For example, the "$. 10, research and development 
included" assumption requires a smaller total cash outflow or investment 
spread over a shorter time period from 1996 onward than the "$.04, research 
and development included" assumption. Presumably the extra funds unused 
in the ' I $ .  10, research and development included" alternative could be earning 
a return elsewhere. To exclude this return would be to compare the alterna- 
tives unfairly. 
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Another set of assumptions which may be relaxed are those having to do 
with income and property taxes and rectenna insurance. Some public utilities 
are owned by the government and do not pay taxes. Also, the government is 
large enough to self-insure. If the original conservative assumptions are 
used except that the SPS project does not pay taxes and insurance, the 
actual IRR is seven percent when research and development is included. If 
research and development is excluded, actual IRR is ten percent. Again, the 
caveat about comparisons of IRR should be noted. 
Finally, it was stated earlier that the expected life of each SPS was 30 
years, but that a 40 year life is a reasonable assumption. If 40 years is 
assumed (other things remaining the same), the actual IRR is five percent 
with research and development included, and six percent without. 
RISK 
Risk has been defined as the "variability of possible returns emanating 
from the project.''5 Upside risk refers to the high side of the variation. 
Major factors contributing to upside risk--40 year satellite life, $. 10/KWH 
price, and tax exemption--were identified and incorporated into the earlier 
analysis. Downside risk refers to the low side of the variation, and it is this 
element of decision that plays a major role in project financing. 
Risk can be measured by developing cash flows based upon pessimistic 
cost or revenue assumptions. Another, more intuitive, definition or measure 
of risk is the payback or payoff period--the length of time before the invest- 
ment is repaid. The longer the time period involved, the less certain the 
investor is of a return because the events and conditions which influence this 
return are further into the future and are thereby less predictable (other 
things being equal). 
In order to comprehend the risk involved, a literature review was under- 
taken, a number of financial professionals were interviewed, and meetings 
were held with NASA/Marshall Space Flight Center personnel.6 In this sec- 
tion the major causal factors influencing downside risk which were uncovered 
in the literature review and discussions are presented. Then, a quantitative 
evaluation of risk using cash flows and payoff periods is displayed and its 
interpretation discussed. 
Cause and Effect Relationships : Qualitative Evaluation 
Variations in project returns are caused by future events and conditions 
impinging upon the project. This is why a purely quantitative analysis of 
risk is insufficient. Quantitative analysis neither causes risk, nor will it 
eliminate risk. The only way downside risk can be limited is by understand- 
ing the nature of relevant events and conditions and taking specific actions to 
deal with them. Those interviewed for this report noted several events and 
conditions which they believed could contribute substantially to the downside 
risk in the SPS cash flow. These fall naturally into four general categories. 
The first is insurance risk, and refers to those disasters which might 
occur from the malfunctioning of the satellite or interference with i t .  A 
second category of downside risk is related to the first and involves inter- 
national repercussions from U . S .  entry into the SPS field. The possibility of 
attack and destruction of one or more satellites by a foreign power is a 
possibility. 
International agreements will need to be worked out because the micro- 
wave beam and possibly the satellites will violate the "air space" of other 
countries. These negotiations may fail o r  be stalled for indefinite periods, 
making the SPS infeasible. 
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Finally, the SPS can be perceived easily by other nations as a sophisti- 
cated weapons systems. Microwave beams themselves can damage body tissue. 
Furthermore, the platforms in space which house the solar blankets could also 
be mounts for powerful lasers or launch platforms for other weapons. 
I t  is not difficult to view the SPS as a platform for a modern day sword 
of Damocles which would hang over the world, capable of falling almost any- 
where on command from a control system located in a remote place--on earth, 
under the earth (or ocean), on the moon, or elsewhere in space. This per- 
ception is likely to be widely held and is not conducive to trust  among 
nations. And the very threat itself will make necessary some kind of agree- 
ment among the principal nations on earth if the SPS is to work. 
Dr. T .  Stephen Cheston' describes a third category of risk as "the 
unpredictable nature of U . S .  political behavior toward projects of this kind 
and scope." He elaborates as follows 
A large investment. in a single new energy generation idea, espe- 
cially one that is space-based, requires a critical mass of sustained 
national will. U.S. history, however, is replete with examples 
where national will has changed radically in a short period of t h e ;  
e . g . ,  in 1961 the U ; S .  was able to mobilize enough will to commit 
$20 billion for Apollo while in 1971 it had great difficulty committing 
only $5.6 billion to Shuttle (the amount was actually far less when 
converted into 1961 dollars). Vietnam, and the subconscious Link- 
ages (rightly or wrongly) of space to it in popular perceptions was 
partially responsible for the dramatic decline in the national interest 
in space projects. A reverse of this was the Eisenhower administra- 
tion rejecting proposals for low cost U . S .  space projects before 
Sputnik; thereafter government space officials were offered open 
checkbooks. A single dramatic event or emerging social processes 
can coalesce to shift public opinion radically on a long-range, 
high-cost project such as SPS. 
The fourth category of downside risk is technological and has two 
aspects. The first involves opportunity costs, while the second involves 
engineering project costs. 
Opportunity costs are those benefits foregone by selecting one alter- 
native over another or others. If the ITbest" alternative is selected, there 
12 
are no opportunity costs. This present analysis shows no comparisons of the 
project costs of alternative methods of generating an amount of power equal to 
the SPS project 
Thus, a way or ways may now exist to produce enough power to satisfy 
U . S .  needs in the next century at a lower cost than the SPS. Or, the means 
to produce lower cost power may be discovered and developed in the future. 
Coal, shale, power from the ocean are all possibilities. 
Furthermore, alternative methods for  providing solar power from space 
may be overlooked when, in fact, they represent a less expensive alternative. 
Proponents of space colonization point to a way to build the SPS using lunar 
8 materials which may prove to be less expensive than terrestrial methods. 
Also, it is clear that the engineering costs on the SPS project itself are 
fa r  from firm. Without probing too deeply into the technical aspects of SPS, 
these three major areas of potential variation in cost are noted: 
Space Transportation. The major questions in this field revolve 
around operating time and cost. Is it possible to fly the number of 
missions necessary in the length of time proposed? The cost to 
transport a kilogram in the Space Shuttle is now between $600 and 
$1000. I t  will be necessary to transport a kilogram into LEO at a 
cost of about $30. Can this be done? Can the proposed ion 
thrusters move the solar array to GEO cheaply and safely? The 
heavy lift launch vehicle has never been built, nor have the ion 
thrusters been perfected. 
Solar Cells. At this time photovoltaic arrays are very expensive. 
The cost of a terrestrial array is somewhere between $10,000 and 
$15,000 per kilowatt. This cost must drop to about $500 per kilo- 
watt and the array must be lightweight and radiation resistant. 
Space rated solar cells have never been produced in quantity, much 
less in the enormous volume needed to blanket an SPS satellite 
structure. 
Orbital Construction and Assembly. The satellite involves a large 
number of parts which must  be assembled into a huge structure in 
a relatively short period of time--perhaps 90 days o r  less--if the 
schedule is to be maintained. This operation has never been per- 
formed before. Can it be done for the amount budgeted? 
13 
Quantitative Evaluation 
The impact of the first three categories of risk--insurance, international 
repercussions and U .  S . political behavior--are very difficult to quantify. 
Opportunity cost comparisons are beyond the scope of this paper. However, 
it is possible to estimate the quantitative impact of risk associated with engi- 
neering costs on the project. 
Exhibit 11-4 shows the preliminary estimates of capital investment re- 
quired per satellite under high, low, and best estimate forecasts of cost 
behavior. The lowest and highest costs have been calculated as percentages 
of the best estimate so that percentage variation may be shown. A s  indicated 
earlier, solar cell blankets have considerable cost risk associated with them. 
In Exhibit 11-4, the highest reasonable estimate of $6 .3  billion for the blan- 
kets is 300 percent above the best estimate. Transportation shows a high 
risk also, while the ground station is much less risky in terms of cost. 
Exhibit 11-5 shows optimistic, pessimistic, and best estimate cash flows 
for the SPS given the original conservative assumptions. Cumulative net cash 
flow is shown in the Exhibit, i . e . ,  annual net cash flows were cumulated and 
the summed figures were plotted on the chart. 
The negative net cash flows, when added, show the total investment 
required for the entire operational phase of the 60 satellite SPS program 
excluding research and development. In the best estimate case, the cumula- 
tive net cash flow reaches a low in the year 2011, and indicates a need for 
$183 billion in capital. That investment is returned by the year 2026, when 
the curve crosses the horizonal axis on the chart .  The payback period, 
therefore, is (2026-1996) or 30 years from the time of the initial investment in 
1996. 
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Eahibii 11.5 
CIlELLlTt POWER SYSTEM 
CUYUUTIVE NET Wn FLOWS 
OPTIMISTIC. BEST ESTHUTE. AND CESWISTIC 
U W h .  10771 
AT twiawti 
INVESTMENT REWIRED 
U W l m .  W77) 
M E -  81134 
hwmnuc U O  
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In the optimistic case, $96 billion is needed before the net cash flow 
turns positive in 2008. Payback of the investment in the optimistic case 
occurs in 2018, a 22-year payoff period. The pessimistic net cash flow does 
not turn positive until the year 2021 after almost $600 billion investment is 
expended. Payback of the investment is not shown on the chart, but occurs 
in the year 2038. Thus, the payback period spans 42 years. 
The cash flow analysis for the 40 year satellite life scenerio is the same 
as that for the original assumption up to the year 2030. Best estimate and 
pessimistic cash flows for the $. 10 per kilowatt hour and tax exempt scenerios 
are displayed in Exhibits 11-6 and 11-7. The improvements in these cash 
flows as a result of changing the assumptions is evident. 
Evaluation of Risk and Return 
Great care must be taken in the interpretation of the risk/return trade- 
off for the SPS presented in this paper. The term risk has been used in a 
general sense as variation in cash flow. In fact, however, risk consists in 
the occurrence or nonoccurrence of events and states of nature which affect 
the cash flow: 9 
Usually, information about the occurrence or  continuation of 
the many events and conditions that influence a given project's cash 
flow can be categorized as certain (or practically certain), risky, 
uncertain, or  unknown. The effects of these variables on the cash 
flow can be categorized in the same way. 
An event o r  condition (or effect on cash flow) is certain if its 
probability of occurrence is 1.0--or very close to 1.0--and the 
decision maker is absolutely confident that this probability is cor- 
rect. A risky event is one that has a probability of occurrence of 
less than 1 .0 .  However, the decision maker is completely confident 
that the probability assigned, whatever it be, is the correct one. 
An uncertain event o r  condition (or effect on cash flow) is charac- 
terized by a probabilty of occurrence below 1.0 and something less 
than absolute confidence in the accuracy of the probability figure. 
Those events that are totally unanticipated--hence have no prob- 
ability assigned to them--are designated as unknown. 
1 7  
Exhibit 116 
SATELLITE PDWER SYSTEM 
CUMULATIVE NET CASH FLOWS 
BEST ESTIMATE AND PESSIMISTIC 
AT $.10/KWH 
IS BYlionr, 1977) 
INVESTMENT REWIRED 1 
I I hrimimc UW.0 IS W l m .  1977) . r c E l r i M n  $102.0 
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Exhibit 11.7 
SATELLITE POWER SYSTEM 
CUMUUTIVE NET CASW F L W .  
BEST ESTIMATE AND PESSIMISTIC 
AT S.OI/KWW 
NO TAXES/INSURANCE 
IS Billions. 1977) 
INVESTMENT REOUIREO n IS B ~ l i o n ~ ,  1977) 
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The Event/Effect Matrix shown in Exhibit 11-8 illustrates the point. If it 
were possible to enumerate all the events and states of nature that will affect 
the SPS cash flow; and if one could estimate and then assign a 100 percent 
correct probability to the state of nature of each event and condition, and to 
the monetary effect each would have on cash flow; then analytical techniques 
designed for  certain risky environments could be applied to the SPS. 
To the extent that uncertainty prevails, scientific risk analysis becomes 
less useful. To the extent that relevant events or conditions and/or their 
effects are unknown, a purely scientific analytical approach is illogical. 
A s  a practical matter, all investment projects are characterized entirely 
by uncertainty and the unknown because the future is uncertain and un- 
known. The SPS is particularly difficult to analyze because (1) so many of 
the events and conditions which affect it are unknown or highly uncertain 
and (2)  the interaction among the events and conditions is uncertain and/or 
unknown. 
A number of factors, such as the political and social issues, are quali- 
tative and subjective in nature. The time spans involved are great, making 
even the identification of causal variables difficult. The project is of unpar- 
alleled magnitude in space technology. 
Furthermore, the interaction among certain events and conditions give 
rise to concurrency, a term which "refers to the simultaneous and interrelated 
development of two or more components of a given project. The words "and 
interrelated" have been emphasized because any continuing project eventually 
reaches the point where all its various components are not only under simul- 
taneous development, but are experiencing interrelated development. If 10 
Concurrency, according to students of the subject, is a previously 
overlooked cause of cost overruns in high technology projects. Problems in 
20 
Exhibit 11-8 
EVENT/EFFECT MATRIX 
Effects of Events 
on Returns Known Risky Uncertain Unknown 
Events or  Conditions Which Are 
(Probabilistic) 
Known Events cer- Events prob- Probability Not 
tain; their abilistic; their of events un- possible 
effects effects known certain; their 
known effects known 
Risky Events cer- Events and Probability of Not 
( Probabilistic ) tain; their their effects events uncer- possible 
effects are probabilistic- tain; probabil- 
probabilistic- ally certain ity of effects 
ally uncertain 
Uncertain 
Unknown 
Source : 
Events cer- Events prob- Probability of Not 
tain; their abilistic; their events and possible 
effects un- effects uncer- effects uncer- 
certain tain tain 
Events cer- Events prob- Probability of Events 
tain; their abilistic; their events uncer- and their 
effects un- effects un- tain; effects effects un- 
known known unknown known 
California Management Review, Winter 1976, p .  76. 
2 1  
the development of one component cause unanticipated delays and difficulties 
in the development of related components and of the project as a whole. 
Hence, large cost overruns occur. Because so many interrelated components 
of the SPS will be developed at the same time, the research and development 
portion of this project and possibly its operations are prime candidates for 
overruns due to concurrency. 
In conclusion, while all of the factors discussed in this section argue for 
great care in the interpretation of the existing estimates, there is no reason 
to conclude that the project is infeasible because of risk or a low initial 
return on investment. Neither is there reason to believe that it will be 
impossible to include a credible financial risk/return analysis in the final 
decision matrix. 
A better conclusion would be that the financial case for the SPS is yet 
to be made, but that there is insufficient evidence to reject SPS as eco- 
nomically infeasible. Hence there is a great need to reduce the level of 
uncertainty and the unknown in the project before a final go/no go decision 
is made. How this may be done is a subject for further research and is 
discussed in Section IV of this white paper. 
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111. PROJECT FINANCE AND MANAGEMENT 
The financing and management of any economic organization are inextric- 
ably intertwined for  at least two reasons. Firs t ,  the financial success of an 
enterprise is absolutely dependent upon the talents of management personnel, 
and upon the way in which the management function is structured in relation 
to the external and internal environment of the organization. Those who 
finance new ventures consider competent management as the most important 
single ingredient for success and will not finance a "second rate" management 
team. 
Secondly, the finance function is a part of the management function. 
The financial manager is normally responsible for obtaining funds from 
external sources and monitoring their use in the f i rm.  His management roles 
in planning and control are well accepted, and the organizational structure of 
the SPS must reflect these roles. 
Furthermore, as the SPS evolves from an ever more complex research 
and development entity to a growing and finally mature operating business, 
its financial and management character and requirements will evolve together. 
In this section, SPS finance and management scenerios are examined at three 
stages of development--research and development, start up and early growth, 
and maturity. The Tennessee Valley Authority and COMSAT Corporation are 
presented as precedent models which may provide guidance to SPS planners. 
FINANCING 
Financing requirements f o r  the SPS differ markedly at each of the three 
stages of SPS development. I t  follows that financing arrangements present 
differing challenges at  each stage. 
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Research and Development 
The financing requirements for the 17 year research and development 
effort are shown in Exhibit 111-1 by phase. During the first six years of the 
project, annual requirements will remain below $1 billion. Over the next 
seven years, they should not exceed $6.5 billion. During the final four 
years, requirements will range from $8.3 to $11.3 billion. 
I 
Exhibit 111-1 
SATELLITE POWER SYSTEM 
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT 
ANNUAL INVESTMENT REQUIRED 
($ Billions, 1977) 
Year 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
1 7  
Technology 
Development 
and 
Verification 
$ . 2  
.5  
.8 
.. 9 
. 9  
.7 
.5 
. 2  
Design 
Test and First 
Evaluation Unit 
Development , 
$ 1 .2  
3.5 
5.3 
6 .3  
6.5 
5.9 
4 . 7  
3 .0  $8.3 
1 . 4  8.3 
.2  8.3 
8.3 
Total 
$ . 2  
. 5  
. 8  
.9 
.9 
.7 
1 .7  
3 .7  
5.3 
6 .3  
6.5 
5 .9  
4.7 
11.3 
9.7 
8 .5  
8 .3  
Source: NASA 
There is general agreement among those surveyed that the federal government 
(or perhaps a consortium of national governments) must underwrite all or the 
major portion of the research and development for the SPS. The dollar 
amounts, especially in the later Years, are  too large for the private sector in 
24 
this country to shoulder. Last year, for example, research and development 
spending in the private sector approximated only $20 billion. The three 
leaders--General Motors, Ford, and IBM--spent only $1.5, $1.2, and $1.1 
billion respectively on their entire programs. A f t e r  these companies, spend- 
ing dropped rapidly. For example, the tenth largest expenditure for 
research and development was $280 million, invested by IT&T. 11 
In addition, the analysis in Section I1 of this paper shows the risk to be 
very high, the payoff period long, and the conservative best estimate of 
return to be rather low at this point in time. These attributes make the 
investment less than attractive to the private sector because the economic 
objectives of most major business f i rms are those of a good return, and 
steady growth in earnings per share and sales. I t  may be possible to engage 
in some cooperative research and development with private industry, espe- 
cially if the results could be immediately beneficial in a related field in which 
the private firms were interested. The potential even here, however, may 
not be great. 
The federal government's economic objectives, however, are different. 
They include (1) growth as measured by changes in the Gross National Pro- 
duct (GNP) ,  (2)  "full" employment as indicated by the Full Employment Act of 
1947, (3)  stability in the general price level, and (4) balance in the nation's 
international balance of payments. 
To the extent that research and development on the SPS employs re- 
sources unutilized o r  underutilized in the economy, the program will con- 
tribute to a non-inflationary increase in GNP and employment. And since 
government and private investment have a multiplier effect on GNP, growth in 
the economy should be greater than the amount of the investment in research 
and development. 
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The end product of the research--a functioning SPS project--would have 
The balance of a potentially great impact on this nation's balance of trade. 
trade o r  net exports measures the difference between imports and exports and 
is a major element in the balance of payments. Exhibit 111-2 displays the 
trade balance over the years 1973-1977. 
Exhibit 111-2 
BALANCE OF TRADE : 1973- 1977 
($ Billions, 1977) 
Component 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 
Exports 101.6 137.9 147.3 162.9 174.7 
Imports 94.4 131.9 126.9 155.1 185.6 
Net Exports 7.2 6.0 20.4 7.8 (10.9) 
Source : Division of Research and Statistics, Federal Reserve System 
Flow of Funds, 1-78. 
An operational SPS network would greatly reduce U . S .  reliance on for- 
eign sources of power, thereby reducing imports. I t  could also represent a 
valuable resource that could be sold to countries in the rest of the world, 
thereby increasing exports. As such, it could help solve a problem with 
which this country must deal for as long as it remains a nation. 
If the federal government chooses to finance the SPS research and 
development, two scenerios may be envisioned. First, the U . S . government 
may act alone. Secondly, it may seek some funding from other countries. 
If the latter course is chosen, knowhow and trade secrets will have to 
be shared. And other countries may want to participate in construction of 
SPS systems. Hence, the opportunity for  the U . S .  to improve its economic 
positions--especially its balance of payments position--will be limited. On the 
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other hand, the project will be a drain on those of our resources which are 
employable in other functions; and if it fails, this country will pay the total 
price. 
A further point should be considered. If a foreign country wishes to 
delay the implementation of the SPS, its best strategy could be to join the 
international organization and obstruct from within. 
Start -Up 
Since four years are required to build an SPS, start-up operations must 
begin at least four years before revenues are generated. The early and 
large capital investments, coupled with the relatively low returns from the few 
systems initially in operation, cause the first ten years of the project to be 
ones of heavy cash outflow. Exhibit 111-3 displays the cash situation over 
the first ten years, which have been (arbitrarily) classifed as the start-up 
years. The original conservative best estimate calculations from Section I1 
have been used. 
Exhibit 111-3 
SATELLITE POWER SYSTEM 
ANNUAL NET CASH FLOW 
($ Billions, 1977) 
Year 
Net Cash 
Flow Year 
$( 6.0) 6 
(18.0) 8 
(12.0) 7 
(24.2) 9 
(20.9) 10 
Net Cash 
Flow 
s(18.5) 
(16.0) 
(13.3) 
(10.5) 
( 9.5) 
Source: NASA 
According to those interviewed for this white paper, the U.S. govern- 
ment o r  a consortium of governments will probably be the only available 
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sources of finance for all o r  most of these ten years. 
lying private investor reluctance to participate will be risk. 
The main reason under- 
It seems reasonable to suppose that national and international political 
and social repercussions from the SPS will not be fully clear until the project 
has been in actual operation for a few years. Further, the technological and 
financial risks cannot be reduced to a minimum until the systems perfom for 
some time. 
Private sector companies are not capable of assuming the extent of risk 
that will be present in the start-up period. Much of the private capital for 
longer term investment is mobilized through large institutions such as insur- 
ance companies, banks, pension funds and the like. These organizations are 
precluded from large risks by government regulations and by the narrow 
range between their cost of money and the usual returns they can expect. 
Undistributed profits of corporations constitute another major source of 
long-term investment capital. Usually, however, these funds are plowed back 
into their respective companies because the firms' long-range strategies call 
for them to invest in products and services closely allied to their present 
product lines. 
Furthermore, large and high-risk investments endanger the capital 
structure of any firm, whether in the field of energy o r  not. Consider the 
following rough estimate of an electric utility company's capital cost as shown 
in Exhibit 111-4. The cost of debt is assumed to be nine percent, but the 
calculation reflects deduction of a corporate income tax of 50 percent. 
The weighted average cost of capital is 9.2 percent. If this figure is 
adjusted downward by, say, four to five percent to reflect the expectations 
about inflation built into i t ,  real capital cost mounts  to four to five percent. 
This cost includes a small amount (perhaps under three percent) to encourage 
suppliers of funds to invest rather than consume. 
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Exhibit 111 -4 
HYPOTHETICAL ELECTRIC COMPANY, INC. 
COST OF CAPITAL CALCULATION 
Capital Percent After Tax Weighted 
Structure of Total cost* Cost of Capital* 
Debt 50% 4.5% .0225 
Preferred Stock 10 9.5 .0095 
Common Stock 40 15.0 .0600 
TOTAL .0920 
and Retained Earnings 
*Not adjusted for inflation 
The remaining one to two plus percent defines the average amount of 
risk capital suppliers expect the Hypothetical Electric Company to take. And 
this percentage is similarly low among all major U.S. corporations. For this 
reason, executives of large corporations are sometimes willing to invest hun- 
dreds of thousands and even millions in a highly risky venture with a high 
potential payoff; but they will not invest hundreds of millions or billions in a 
risky venture, even if the possible payoff appears to be enormous. 
Nevertheless, funds will exist in the late 1990s and early 2000s to invest 
in SPS, if the investment vehicles are government guaranteed. In 1977, 
12 $340.5 billion was raised in U.S. long and short term credit markets. 
Corporations’ cash flows totalled $135.9 billion that year,” and investment in 
plant and equipment amounted to $137.0 billion.14 Public utilities spent 
approximately $26.1 billion for new plant and equipment during 1977. 15 
According to a study published by the Edison Electric Institute,16 the 
real GNP will double between 1980 and the year 2000. If all the figures 
mentioned in 
future values 
negative cash 
the above paragraph were doubled to (roughly) indicate their 
in 1977 dollars, it is evident that the economy can deal with the 
flows generated b y  the SPS start-up. 
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Ma turit v 
At some point after start-up, it may become feasible for private com- 
panies to invest in all o r  a part of one or more systems. The Rockwell 
International Study, l7 based in part on conversations with Southern California 
Edison Corporation, postulated a situation whereby an SPS satellite would be 
owned and operated by the government, while the rectenna would be owned 
and operated by a consortium of private companies. 
Consortia exist now for similar purposes. For example, the Washington 
Power Supply Corporation consists of 126 public and private utilities investing 
over $4 billion in two nuclear plants. I t  is being financed by bonds at the 
rate of $600 to $800 million per year. 
Some of those interviewed for this white paper suggested that, in addi- 
tion, the larger non-power companies making extensive use of energy may 
wish to participate to ensure a source of supply. Large aluminum companies 
are one example. 
Nevertheless, financing a complete SPS from the private marketplace may 
represent a supreme challenge to the financial community even in, say, 2010 
when the U . S .  economy could be three times its current size. To explain 
this view more fully, some perspective is necessary. 
Based upon the NASA best estimate data, a $12 billion SPS will be built 
over four years, necessitating a cash outflow for construction of $3 billion 
per year. A s  Exhibit 111-5 indicates, total investment will slightly exceed $12 
billion, and will not be fully recovered until 17 years later. 
Three billion dollars per year per system is a large sum, if capital must 
be mobilized by private means. A typical public utility common stock place- 
ment today is around $50 to $75 million. Few common stock offerings in any 
industry exceed $100 million--the recent offering of two million shares of 
Phillip Morris at  $66 per share being a rare  exception. 
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The recent corporate debt financing of $250 million by General Motors is 
considered very large by today's standards. The largest tax exempt bond 
issue in memory was $440 million according to one expert in the field. The 
Washington Power Supply Corporation example, then, is apparently an excep- 
tion. 
These figures are meant only to suggest that new ways or  new combina- 
tions of old ways of private financing will need to be devised if the private 
sector is to participate in any meaningful way in SPS financing. This holds 
even if the figures are tripled to represent real growth in the economy over 
the next 25-30 years. 
One such new scenerio would be for government to finance an SPS and 
then to sell or lease all or part of it to a private venture with payment over 
an extended period--say, 10 to 30 years. Another would be a joint venture 
partnership between government and industry with each providing some cash 
and resources, the amounts to be determined through negotiation. 
On the other hand, why involve the private sector at  all? The govern- 
Why should private ment has taken all the risk in development of the SPS. 
enterprise now step in at project maturity and reap the profits? 
There is no firm evidence now that private sector management would do 
a better job than managers on the payroll of a public corporation. A s  one 
author points out: "Examples can be adduced to support a case for either 
side of the argument, . . . And there is no 
evidence that decentralized management by private enterprise of individual 
SPS units would be more efficient than centralized management of the total 
system. 
No conclusion is justified."18 
Moreover, there is ample precedent for government or  public enterprises 
The government developed the Alaska Railroad, pioneered crop of this kind. 
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insurance, and began providing rural electricity because the private sector 
saw little profit in these ventures. The government financed the Panama 
Canal and river developments because of their high initial costs and great 
risks. And it has stepped in for purposes of resource conservation to pre- 
serve the nation's grazing lands and forests and to provide irrigation. The 
government developed atomic energy at great economic risk and manages its 
use in defense because the national security role outweighed pure economic 
considerations. 19 
In short, a strong case can be made for excluding the private sector. 
But there are counter arguments; and here are three: 
First, if great economic profits are to be reaped from the SPS a t  matur- 
i ty,  and the private sector is to be involved, the federal government as the 
representative of the people who took. the development risks can ensure that 
the people enjoy the benefits in one of two ways: (1) regulatory agencies 
could Limit the profits of the enterprise by regulating the price, and (2) the 
government could license the technology to industry, charging a fee that 
would Limit the profit of private enterpreneurs . 
Second, the U.S. developed under a tradition of free enterprise, hamp- 
This tradition is still ered as little as possible by government "interference." 
a strong one in the minds of the U . S .  citizenry. 
Third, public corporations in this country--with the exception of the 
TVA, the Federal Reserve Board and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp- 
oration--are subject to Civil Service. And all public corporations must have 
their administrative expenses (a key area) approved by Congress and the 
Bureau of the Budget. They are not free of political control, and political 
control may sooner or later corrupt economic efficiency. 2o Lord Acton's 
famous admonition about power tending to corrupt and absolute power tending 
to corrupt absolutely may be worth keeping in mind. 
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In any case, the question in one important sense is not whether the SPS 
is financed and owned by government or  private enterprise. Private enter- 
prise will in fact constitute the major portion of the SPS totality unless the 
government enters the subcomponent manufacturing and fabrication business 
in an unprecedented way. And even if private enterprise were to own the 
entire system eventually, it would be regulated by the government in the 
public interest. 
A s  Exhibit 111-6 illustrates, the entire system at each stage consists of a 
vast number of contractors, subcontractors and suppliers in a large and 
complex hierarchy. The satellite, rectenna transportation ? and assembly 
portions of the SPS which have appeared as costing elements of the system 
represent only the tip of the iceburg or pyramid. While it is true that the 
tip of the pyramid regulates and controls the remainder, it is also true that 
the tip is Limited, directed and shaped by the base upon which it rests. 
MANAGEMENT 
The key to successful management of the SPS project will be the ability 
of its executives at each stage of SPS development (1) to relate the entire 
SPS pyramid to the external environment, and (2)  to relate the tip of the 
pyramid to its remainder. Role models now exist suggesting that favorable 
external relationships can be developed on a national and international scale. 
The Tennessee Valley Authority and COMSAT Corporation are two which are 
briefly reviewed here. Then, the questions of internal organizational man- 
agement and design are considered. 
The External Environment 
TVA was organized in 1933 as an independent government owned corp- 
oration which was, in the words of President Roosevelt, "charged with the 
broadest duty of planning for the proper use, conservation, and development 
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of the natural resources of the Tennessee River drainage basin and its ad- 
joining territory. . . . 'I2' This was seen as a unified and systematic regional 
program with headquarters located in the area so that interaction with state 
and local agencies, businessmen, and farmers could be facilitated. 
Today it is involved in a variety of activities including the provision of 
over 100 billion kilowatt hours of electricity per year, water management, 
agricultural and chemical development, and research. TVA is funded by the 
federal government, but its Office of Power has been self-supporting from 
electricity revenues. 22 An organizational bulletin is appended to this paper. 
Communications Satellite Corportation (COMSAT) was incorporated in 1963 
to carry out the congressional mandate to establish, along with other partici- 
pating countries, a commercial communications satellite system which would 
span the globe. The company was capitalized through the sale of $200 million 
in common stock on the public market in 1964. 23 
In August, 1964, the International Telecommunications Satellite Organiza- 
tion (INTELSAT) was formed as a joint venture among 19 countries. By 
August, 1977, 98 countries had joined. Each signatory to the operating 
agreement may own an investment share in INTELSAT that equals its per- 
centage of system use. Shares may be traded among signatories. 
COMSAT owned about 25 percent of INTELSAT as of December, 1977, 
COMSAT also provides operational and tech- and is the largest shareholder. 
nical services to INTELSAT under a management contract. 
COMSAT General, a wholly owned subsidiary, provides maritime satellite 
communications thorugh its MARISAT system and is a partner in Satellite 
Business Systems which is developing an all-digital domestic satellite system. 
COMSAT General also leases capacity of its COI"AR satellites to AT&T for 
U. S .  domestic communications. 24 
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In-depth analyses of the management of these and other models (both 
successful and unsuccessful) is beyond the scope of this white paper. I t  
seems clear, however, that TVA and COMSAT have maintained good relation- 
ships with their external publics because they perform vital services, are well 
managed, and take pains to maintain a good image. In the case of COMSAT/ 
INTELSAT, furthermore, voting power in the international body is exercised 
on the basis of financial participation through share ownership. And owner- 
ship is open to all who use the system. 
The Internal Environment 
The objective of the SPS research and development stage will be to place 
a five gigawatt system in operation in 17 years given a budget. This is a 
unique, one time effort and the functional organization that undertakes it wi l l  
either disband altogether or change dramatically when the objective is 
reached. The task is complex, dynamic, and interdisciplinary. The basic 
orientation is scientific. 
A t  start-up, most of this will change. The objectives will be (1) to 
establish domestic and international markets for electrical power, and (pos- 
sibly) markets for SPS units, and (2) to produce, install and (possibly) 
manage SPS units in response to the demand. This is a continuing, often 
repetitive effort requiring an entrepreneurial spirit. Survival and rapid 
growth will be key issues. The basic orientation will be towards marketing. 
A s  the project matures, the objectives will remain the same, but the 
emphasis will move somewhat away from marketing towards production. Prob- 
lems of control and budgeting will replace those of survival and rapid growth 
as the key issues. Functions and tasks will vary only slightly over time, but 
will remain complex and technical. Entrepreneurial management will give way 
to a more steady state managerial style, and the environment will become more 
predictable. 
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I t  is clear that the type. of organization structure and management style 
appropriate for one stage will not do for another. Furthermore, the organi- 
zational structure best suited for  the overall organization of one (or  all) SPS 
units should not be duplicated in exact detail at every level and functional 
area in the pyramidal organization. Obviously , the research and development 
department should not be structured exactly like the overall company, nor 
should it resemble the organization that manufactures solar power cells, o r  
the one that fabricates satellites in space. None of these will look exactly 
alike. 
In developing an organization, it is important to observe that structure 
will vary depending upon how objectives and policies are set. If objectives 
and policies are established on high in great detail for each functional unit, 
the organization is centralized. If broad strategy is established at  the top, 
but the responsibility for  setting goals and policies consistent with the strat- 
egy is centered at lower levels, the organization is decentralized. 
Obviously, centralization is a matter of degree rather than kind. How- 
ever, smaller companies and divisions of larger companies with a relatively 
small number of products tend to be more centralized than large diversified 
companies with many product lines. The TVA organizational structure de- 
scribed in the appendix appears to be decentralized, at least at the higher 
levels. 
Structure also depends upon the nature of the work and how it is car- 
ried out. When job descriptions and procedures necessary to perform and 
carry out tasks are detailed, concrete and inclusive; and when line officers 
see themselves as decision makers who issue instructions; a formal structure 
is being defined. Behavior tends to be task-oriented and formal. This type 
of organization most  closely resembles the rational bureacuracy invented by 
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the military and is found most often in companies where the technology is not 
complex. 
At the other extreme is the informal organization, where leadership is 
based on knowledge or a specialized skill.  This type of management has been 
termed democratic or .  ad hoc. It may be found in scientific laboratories o r  
elsewhere where those who do the work also coordinate with others and inte- 
grate their work with that of other units. 
At its extreme, informal managment envisions a continuously changing 
technology and job structure, where planning is performed by anyone with 
the relevant knowledge to do so. The term often associated with this form is 
team management. 
Between the extremes of formal and informal is a type of structure 
termed project management, which involves one or more individuals developing 
a team to perform a task or  function within the framework of the larger 
organization. The project manager uses resources from several functional 
departments in a centralized organization to produce and market a unique 
product on a one-time-only basis. He cuts across the normal organizational 
structure and develops strong lateral working relationships. This form is 
often found in the construction industry, for example. 
The matrix organization is found in less centralized companies, and it 
functions like project management. However, relationships across the 
organizational structure are generally less formal and lasting. Aerospace 
25 companies typically use this form of organization on their contract work. 
The relationships between goal setting and the way work is carried out 
is displayed in Exhibit 111-7. While it is not feasible at  this point to design a 
structure or structures for  SPS, it is nonetheless possible to make some brief 
generalizations to relate the foregoing to the SPS project. 
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Formal 
Mixed 
Info ma l  
It  is very likely that the federal government will sponsor the research 
and development of the SPS--at least the technology development and verifi- 
Rational o r  Structurally 
Mechanistic Decentralized* 
Project Management Matrix Management 
Democratic Team or Group 
Management 
cation portion. Furthermore, it is unlikely that the one government agency 
in charge will be either willing or able to do much of the actual work itself. 
Hence, one can envision a relatively small government coordinating group at 
the top of a research and development pyramid. 
This coordinating group will be controlling a decentralized organization 
made up of other government units and private organizations which appear 
capable of meeting its strategic goals. Most of the units it will contract with 
will be organized along matrix/group management or project/democratic lines, 
depending upon the size of the subcontracting organization. ( A  large sub- 
contractor such as a major aerospace firm is more likely to be decentralized 
and therefore to use a matrix approach.) 
When and if the SPS becomes operational and mature,' there are many 
forms it may take. For example, four separate entities may be created that 
operate semiautonomously , providing ( 1) transportation, which is purchased 
by (2)  a satellite manufacturing company whose sales and service are handled 
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by (3)  a management firm selling to (4) individual o r  group owners of rec- 
tenna farms. 
Or, the entire SPS project could be owned or  managed by a government 
or multinational government agency. In this case, the organization may be 
structurally decentralized at  the higher levels. Alternatively, it may be more 
efficient (at least initially) to treat each SPS as a project, using project 
management techniques across such functional specialities as transportation, 
satellite construction, rectenna construction, and operations and maintenance. 
The system, o r  parts of i t ,  might later be transferred to private hands 
through a lease or buyout arrangement over time. In such case, the govern- 
ment would act as a regulatory body and the organization structure would 
change again. 
How ownership and management develops in practice over the Life of the 
SPS project will depend to a great extent on several factors. One is the 
political/social realities of the SPS. W i l l  other nations permit the U.S. to 
build and operate it alone? Does the U . S .  government deem it politically 
desirable to work with other countries? W i l l  political pressure force the 
project partially or completely into private hands, or  will the reverse occur? 
Another factor is the stage of development of the project, whether 
research and development, start-up, or maturity. What will be the public/ 
private mix in the SPS pyramid at each developmental stage? How will the 
pyramid itself and each element in it be structured, organized and financed? 
A 
strong leader can exert considerable influence on the goals, organization 
structure, 
A third is the quality and nature of project leadership at each stage. 
and international position of the project. 
A fourth factor--closely related to the others--is the overall organiza- 
tional design of the program. 
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Definitive answers to these and other related questions must await fur- 
ther research. Some of the directions this research should take is the 
subject of the following section. 
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I V .  FURTHER RESEARCH 
Further research in the finance/management scenerio area should have as 
its objectives (1) reducing uncertainty and unknowns in the SPS project as a 
whole, and (2)  planning for the research and development stage of the pro- 
ject, particularly its technology development and verification phase. The first 
objective is necessary as a continuing part of overall project feasibility analy- 
sis. 
The second objective is required for success in meeting stage one objec- 
tives and must be completed before a go/no go decision is made on the 
technology development and verification phase of the SPS project in 1980. 
Otherwise, if a go decision is made, unnecessary delays for planning will be 
introduced into the systeia. 
REDUCING UNCERTAINTY AND UNKNOWNS 
Reducing finance and management uncertainty and unknowns in the 
overall SPS project involves (1) identifying and evaluating the events and 
conditions which may effect the project, (2) estimating their impact on project 
cash flow and on management, and (3 )  determining what steps may be taken 
at what cost to counter undesirable events and conditions and to take advant- 
age of opportune ones. The following research projects will help reduce 
uncertainty and unknowns. 
Industry Analyses 
Cost ,analyses have been done on the various components of the SPS 
pyramid to provide initial cost inputs for project feasibility analyses. And a 
detailed work breakdown structure has been established to describe the 
system. 26 
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The next step is to examine in more detail the industries and companies 
which will be contractors, subcontractors and suppliers to the system. The 
purpose of the examination should be: 
To identify the industries and the companies in each industry 
that will supply the goods and services needed for each of the 
three phases of SPS development and to identify their position 
in the organizational pyramids for each phase. 
To identify potential bottlenecks in the system. Can the 
companies currently in each industry identified in (1) supply 
the requisite goods and services on time at  the expected price? 
If the price is found to be higher or lower than expected, how 
will this affect overall SPS financial feasibility? Do these 
companies have a ready availability of sufficient labor and raw 
materials? W i l l  more plant capacity be needed? W i l l  more 
managers need to be trained? Can expansion be financed out 
of retained earnings or  will prepayments and additional private 
or public financing be required? 
To recommend steps that can be taken now and in the future 
to eliminate the potential bottlenecks. This should include an 
analysis of concurrency potential and recommendations for 
system redundancy to Limit the risk of concurrency. 
To provide a competitive analysis for product selection in cases 
where more than one company can provide an essential good or 
service. 
To recommend the most efficient and effective organizational 
structures at each point within the organizational pyramid at 
each phase of SPS development. An intensive review of the 
experience of such organizations as COMSAT Corporation and 
TVA would be helpful in making these recommendations. 
These studies should be performed in considerable detail in 1979 for the 
research and development phase of the project, since they would be of immed- 
iate value in the event of a decision to begin work on the SPS in 1980. 
Sufficient information must be gathered by 1980 for the other two phases 
(start-up and maturity) to provide a further in-depth look at  SPS economic 
feasibility and to determine what must be done now to ensure achievement of 
objectives 17 plus years from now. 
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One approach to these studies would be to identify the key government 
agencies, firms, and industries involved, and then to prepare investment 
memoranda o r  business venture proposals for each product or service where 
expansion o r  new product development is necessary. These proposals would 
describe the new venture o r  expansion, present a plan for its implementation, 
and show its feasibility by means of cash flow and risk analyses. A t  some 
point a political/economic evaluation would have to be made to determine 
whether the product o r  service should be provided by private industry or the 
government. 
A standard approach to competitive analysis is a matrix showing competi- 
tors across the top and selection criteria such as cost, quality, design 
characteristics, delivery sched.cl!es, 2nd so rrn down the side. Such an 
approach could be modified for  SPS purposes. 
These analyses, done for  each stage of SPS project development, can be 
brought together in constructing effective and efficient organizational frarne- 
works or SPS pyramids. These pyramids may then be examined for  economic 
and political feasibility. 
Analyses of Alternative S y s tem s 
A major risk of the SPS is the opportunity cost if it is selected when in 
fact an alternative system would deliver the same amount of power at  a lower 
cost while meeting all other constraints. Currently, studies are being under- 
taken to evaluate non-SPS power systems including wind, power from the 
ocean, and so on. 
Opportunity cost would also be incurred if the approach taken to SPS 
development was more expensive than a known alternative. For example, in 
Section I1 it was noted that recent studies have indicated that the manufac- 
ture of SPS units at a moon based space manufacturing facility from lunar 
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materials is technically feasible, .and that it is logistically feasible to implement 
it. Financial and economic analyses currently in progress may show a higher 
return on investment and a shorter payback period for this alternative com- 
pared with the one analyzed in this white paper. 
To minimize the risk of incurring substantial opportunity cost, alterna- 
tives should' be compared on a common set of criteria and constraints. 
Externalities associated with each alternative should be included in the analy- 
sis. 
The first step in developing such an analysis would be to establish a 
common set of criteria, constraints, and ground rules against which each 
alternative can be measured. These might be weighted if weighting appears 
feasible and useful. Then, data for each alternative would be cast into the 
established criteria/constraints framework and compared, taking into account 
externalities. Finally, the best approaches would be selected and tradeoffs 
made among criteria, constraints and externalities where appropriate. In this 
way a proper m i x  of power alternatives for the period 2000AD and beyond 
may be developed. 
Sensitivity Analysis 
The cash flow and return on investment analyses showed that SPS pro- 
ject attractiveness was particularly sensitive to three factors above and 
beyond variances in system cost: 
1. Whether the enterprise would be subject to taxes. 
2 .  Whether the SPS project should be expected to show a return 
on its research and development costs as well as its opera- 
tions. 
3 .  Radical changes in the real price of electricity. 
from $.04 to $. 10 per kilowatt hour was tested. ) 
(An increase 
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The first two factors have political as well as economic implications which 
should be examined. The benefits and disbenefits of including taxes and 
research and development costs should be enumerated and analyzed, and 
recommendations made. 
An in-depth analysis and forecast of power pricing over the years 2000 
to 2060 should be made under several applicable alternative scenerios. These 
estimates should be introduced into the continuing feasibility analysis of the 
project. 
Finally, a search should be made for other conditions and events which 
will effect SPS project cash flow. These should be tested in a cash flow 
model on a basis consistent with the others. 
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT MANAGEMENT 
The industry analyses research project recommended earlier in this 
section will provide data for the structuring of the SPS organizational pyramid 
at each stage of project development. This "bottom up" approach is essential 
for good organizational design as well as for planning and feasibility analysis. 
However, the research and development phase of the project cannot await 
the results of this study before beginning a systematic search for competent 
management talent to direct and control the project. Furthermore, the struc- 
ture of the organization itself will reflect the style of its chief executive 
officer and his associates. A "top down" approach to executive selection and 
to selection (or creation) of an administrative agency should begin immed- 
iately. 
The first step should be to define the functions and the tasks and 
subtasks to be carried out by the SPS research and development administra- 
tive structure. The output of each task and subtask should be defined as 
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carefully as possible, and the user of the output and his requirements identi- 
fied. This will keep unnecessary reports and other activities to a minimum. 
When the tasks are known, an estimated budget for each function can be 
developed. 
A t  the same time, functions can be grouped according to their similari- 
Individual functions and groups of functions will form the organization 
In effect, the 
ties. 
structure and the basis for selection of management personnel. 
functions become job descriptions. 27 
For each job description, a set of personal requirements including educa- 
tion, experience, and so on should be developed. These requirements may be 
divided into manditory and non-manditory, and even weighted if desired. In 
addition, for each job description, a set of personality characteristics should 
be developed. The job description, personal requirements and personality 
characteristic sets become the profile used to seek qualified candidates for  
each position. 
Researchers in this study should work closely with those doing the 
research and development industry analyses so that the "top down" approach 
will mesh with the "bottom up" approach. In this way, correct structuring 
for coordination and control of the research and development pyramid may be 
assured. 
Researchers also must work very closely with DOE officials responsible 
for the project. The SPS project management team, when selected, will be 
working with these officials and they will have an important input into execu- 
tive selection. 
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Tennessee Valley Authority 
OfEce of the General h!sn?-ger 
I TVA 
ORGANIZATION OF THE TENNESSEE VAt-LEY AUTHORITY 
The Rosrd --._ of Direct&, under the TV-4 Act, is wsted with all the powers of the 
Corporation. The Eoard estYGishes gmwal policies wid  proganis; reviews 2nd apprarses 
progcss 2nd results; approves projects aod specific items \vhich are of major importance, 
involve impoi4ant external relations, or otl>er\\ise require Board approval; approves the 
annual budget; and establishes the‘ basic organization through which progrzms and policies 
arc esecutcd. 
The General Counsel advises the Board o n  legal matters. He, or the representative h e  
designates to act in his abscnce, SC‘II’CS 9s Sccret ruy to the Corporztion. 
The General 3 1 a n a ~ r  is the piinciyal TVA administrative officer. He serves as liaison 
betwxn the Board and the offices and di\isions in the handling of matters of Board 
concern, and is responsible for coordinating the execution of programs, polide;, a d  
decisions which the Board of Diicctors approves or  adopts. He brings before the Board 
niztters lvliich require its consideration o r  approval; assists the B o x d  in presenting the  T V A  
budget to the Office of hlanzgetncnt and Budget and to Congress; affii’ins to the Board the 
adcquacp of staff coordinztion and contribution in matters presented for its consideration, 
includiiig judgments relating to broad public consequences, social and economic effects, ;urd 
planning and program direction; intcrprcts the Board’s instructions to the offices and 
divisions; origijiates or approves administrative controls to ensure integrated esecution of 
the  total TVA prograin; and reports to the Board on overall efficiency, effectiveness, and 
ecchorny of TVA operations. 
The General Manager assigns duties and makes delegations to the TVA offices, 
divisions, and staffs in their esecution ‘of programs and policies which the Board of 
Directors adopts, subject to such controls as i t  may establish. He reviews and 3pproves major 
T V A  management methods, major organization changes within offices and divisions, and 
major staff appointments, and recommends to the  Board basic changes in the T V A  
organization. He is responsible for ensuring tha t  appropriate matters are presented in 
coordinated form to the Board a t  the proper t ime and that the Board has pertinent related 
information. He provides for the formal definition and communication of TVA programs, 
policies, procedures, and continuing delegations of authority and responsibility. 
Theoffice of the General 3lanager includes the  danning Staff, the Budget Staff, the 
Information Office, the Equal Employment Opportunity Staff, the Washington Office, the 
Power Financing Officer, and such other assistnts as the General Manager may require to 
perform spccizlizcd duties or  to aid h im in espediting, coordinating, and disposing of 
currcnt busincss. The functions of the above groups are set out  in the Organization Bulletin, 
“Office of the General Jlmager” (I GESERAL hl.4NAGER). 
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I TVA 
. The - Division of Finance -- formulates, recomnieiids, administers, and cva!uates policies 
related to accounting, auditing, financial reporting, and the handling of TVA funds; 
estnl>lis11es systems of accounting and internal control, including accounting controls Over 
TVA property and other assets; devclops related instructions and procedures; and advises 
a i d  assists on matters pertaining to these fuiictions. I t  performs accounting and 
ad!niniztrative work for the TVA Retireincnt System. 
The -- Division of Law liandlcs all litigztion, lcgal proceedings, claims, and other legal 
prohlcins relating to TVA's activities; advises and 2ssists on legislative matters h which T \ ~ A  
hzs an intzrest; gives legal advice, opinions, and assistance; and preparcs or zpprovcs a d  
co;~atlucs 2!1 Jocumcnts affecting 'TVA's legal rclztionships. 
'Ilie Division of Personnel formulates, recommends, administers, and cvalua tcs 
policies in the ficld of pusonncl administration, including those related to recruitment, 
selection, clzssification, compciisation, and training of personnel, union-management 
relations, organization, administrative relations, personnel management information, and 
related aspects of pcrsonncl administrntion; conrl~icts negotiations with unions representing 
employees; ckvelops pcrsoiiiicl stniidards and yrocctlurcs; aqd ndviscs and assists in the  
handling a i d  esecution of in.?ttcrs and nctions rc1;:tcd to '1'VA personnel zdrninistrntion. 
b 
*The Division of Property and Sen4ces develops, recominends, and carries ou t  plans, 
policies, and activities related to acquisition, transfer, and disposal of real property; 
administration of 'rVA lands not  managed by program divisions; operation and upkeep of 
dam resei~ations; site planning a n d  landscape architectural services; property protection and 
l a w  enforcement; and visitor inforination a t  appropriate T V A  propertics. I t  provides 
spccializcd sei~iccs  on TVA lands and reservations for other programs when in the interest 
of efficiency and ccono~ny.  I t  formulates, recommends, adininiskrs, and eualuatcs policies 
relatcd to the provision of computing and systems development s e n h s ;  transportation 
scivices; coordination of noninilitary defense measures, eniploycc housing assistmce, and 
offices services, and analyses of office systems; and develops re?atcd shndards and 
procedures, and advises and assists in their application and use. 
me Division of Purchising formulates, recommends, administers, and cvaluatcs 
policies relating io the procure~nent, shipping, transfer, and disposal of equipinent, 
matcrids, supplies, and services, csccpt personal scnvices; and iss\les instructions and advises 
and assists 011 matters related to the application of these policies. 
The Office of Agricultural and Chemical Dcvelopmcnt formulates, recommcnds. and 
carries o u t  pTans, policies, and programs for research in and  development of e spe r imend  
new and improved forms of fcrtilizcrs and processes for their manufacture; for testing and 
dcmonstrsting the value and best methods of fertilizer use as an aid to soil and water 
consenation and to improved use of agrjculatural and related resources; for dcvcloping, 
operating, and maintaining facilities to as a national laboratory for the d u d  purposes 
of research in chemistry and chcmical engineering in the development and production Of 
espcrirnentd fertilizers and the design 2nd hs t ing  of improved manufacturing processes, and 
for thc production and provision of basic, chcniicd materials and scrviccs in the inunitions 
ficld essential to national dcfcnsc; for rcaJjustincnt of agricultural areas affcctcd by 'TVA 
0pcralions;and for rclatcd activities ha\ing t o  do with the nianagcment m d  use Of 
zgrkultural resources znd \sith national defense. 
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I TVA 
The Office of Engineering Design and Construction participates in the planning and 
prokjdes or obtains the archikctural trcatrnent, engineering design, and construction of dl 
permulent structures and permanent engineering works which are authorized +to be built in 
the  TVA program, in accordance with the requirementssdetermined by the offices and 
divisions having program responsibilities for such structures and works, except for power 
transmission, distribution, and conimunication facilities and switclihouses a t  sub'stations not  
adjacent to generating stations; and provides other endneering, architectural, an& 
construction services as feasible and economical. 
The Division of Environmental Plaiining recommends, develops, coordinates, and 
carries out  programs and activities related to TVA's interests in environmental quality of the 
region. I t  ;evsws and evaluates the environmental impact of programs a i d  activities 
proposcd and carried out  by other offices and divisions and provides technical guidince and 
assistance as needed to assure that appropriate environmental protection features are 
planned and implemented. I t  conducts field monitoring and environmental quality studies 
and investigations at TVA instllations. It provides environmental data and technical 
assistance to state and local agencies. It coordinates and administers envkonmental research 
and detnonstration projects camed out by TVA in  cooperation with other agencies and 
organizations. It serves as TVA's liaison \\pith other governmental agencies concerned with 
environmental planning and protection. In collaboration with other divisions, i t  develops 
and applies programs to assess and control potential hazards in the work environment of 
'PI71 -...- A..nnC 
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The Division of Medical Sewices develops, recommends, and executes plans and 
policics relafrz to the hcdth  of eniployees and of the  public affected by TVA activities, and 
to TVA's intcrcsts in community health education and health planning. It participates in 
medical research and development activities, demonstrations, and other cooperative 
activities with Federal, state, and local agencies and other organizations. 
The Office of Power develops, recommends, and appraises objectives, plans, policies, 
and programs, and carries out  approved policies, programs, and activities for the generation, 
transmission, and utilization of electric power; forecasts future needs of the power program 
and plans means and methods of meeting those needs; and cooperates with other TVA 
organizations in carrying out TVA's multiple-purpose programs involving power activities. 
The Office of Tributary Area Development administers TVA's interests in 
comprehensive activities designed to obtain maximum economic progress in  tributary areas 
of the Tennessee Valley reeon. It works with state and Federal agencies and with local 
governmental and citizen groups in organizing for, planning, and carrying out  unified 
resource development programs in indivjdual areas. It administers contracts for related 
studies and demonstrations. I t  coordinates the participation of other TVA offices and 
divisions in dl stages of tributary area planning and development. 
*The  Division of Forestry, Fisheries, and  Wildlife Development formulates, 
recommcnds, and conducts investigative and development programs in forestry, fisheries, 
and wildlife, directed tolvard mzyi&um sustained production and use of these resources for 
their contribution t o  the regional economy and cnvironrnent. Jt plans and administers Land 
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getween The Lakes to dEmonstrate socid, economic, and other benefits in unified 
development and management of these and other natural resources.for lage-scde outdoor 
recreation znd environmental education Uses -  It develops, recommends, coordinates, and 
=des out plans, policies, and activities related to development of Valley recreation 
resources. It maintains cooperative relationships with Federal, state,  and other appropsak  
agencies and industries concerned with these resources. 
The Division of Navigation Development and Regional Studies develops, 
recommends, and carries out  plans, policies, and programs for  the navigation engineen'ng 
development of the Tennessee River system and for its full and effective use in development 
of the region; conducts studies and research and advises and assists the General hfanager, 
offices, and  divisions 'on social, economic, and governmental relationships, and r e d o n a  
planning problems and opportunities of importance to development of the region; and 
perfoms related activities. 
The Division of Water Management providcs a comprehensive program of \ \ - a b  
resources management in the Tennessee Valley region which includes flood damzge 
abatement and the scheduling of relcascs from all TVA-owned and TVAaperated reservoirs 
'in accordance with the TVA Act, taking into consideration all essential objectives of water 
resources management such as flood control, navigstion, power production, water quality 
management, water supply, and recreation. It provides specialized services yhich include the 
development and operation of environmental monitorhg systems, engineering geologic 
investigations, land approvals, topographic mapping, engineering .surveying, engineering 
laboratory research and testing, and hydrologic and hydraulic research activities. 
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